Abstract: Since Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in stream modes, such as counter (CTR), output feedback (OFB) and cipher feedback (CFB), can meet most industrial requirements, the range of applications for dedicated stream ciphers is decreasing. There are many attack results using algebraic properties and side channel information against stream ciphers for hardware applications. Al-Hinai et al. presented an algebraic attack approach to a family of irregularly clock-controlled linear feedback shift register systems: the stop and go generator, self-decimated generator and alternating step generator. Other clock-controlled systems, such as shrinking and cascade generators, are indeed vulnerable against side channel attacks. To overcome these threats, new clock-controlled systems were presented, e.g., the generalized alternating step generator, cascade jump-controlled generator and mutual clock-controlled generator. However, the algebraic attack could be applied directly on these new systems. In this paper, we propose a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator, which has resistance to algebraic and side channel attacks. This generator also preserves both security properties and the efficiency of existing clock-controlled generators.
Introduction
Since the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that Rijndael was proclaimed the winner of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) competition, no critical security weaknesses have been demonstrated for this algorithm until now [1] . In addition, it has been reported that its performance implemented in software and hardware seems to be excellent across a wide range of computing environments [2, 3] . Especially, AES in counter (CTR) or output feedback (OFB) mode can meet most requirements for stream cipher systems, so that there has been an unavoidable long-term decline for stream ciphers.
At the State of the Art in Stream Ciphers (SASC) 2004 and Asiacrypt 2004, A. shamir presented an invited lecture titled "Stream Ciphers: Dead or Alive?" [4] . In this lecture, he pointed out that stream ciphers would survive only in some niche applications. These applications are as follows:
• software-oriented applications with exceptionally high speed (e.g., routers)
• hardware-oriented applications with an exceptionally small footprint (e.g., RFID, smart cards)
Stream ciphers for hardware-oriented applications with restricted resources are often designed using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) [5] . LFSRs are well suited for hardware implementation. They can produce sequences with large periods and good statistical properties. To generate keystreams with good statistical properties, designers usually used LFSR output sequences as follows [6] :
• use multiple LFSRs and a nonlinear combining function • use a single LFSR and nonlinear filter function • use irregular clocking of the LFSRs (clock-controlled generators)
However, these generators with LFSRs are potentially very vulnerable to algebraic attacks and side channel attacks.
An algebraic attack that uses over-defined systems of multivariate equations to recover the secret key has gained much attention. These equations are derived relating the output bits to the internal state bits for the generators. Let the size of the internal state be l and the low degree of the equations be d; then, the time complexity of the algebraic attack is O(l d ) ω , where ω is the exponent of Gaussian reduction (ω < 3). In the paper [7] , the value of ω is log 2 7. Various algebraic attacks were first applied to block ciphers and public key cryptosystems [8] [9] [10] . Thereafter, these attacks have been effectively applied to LFSR-based systems [11] [12] [13] [14] . In particular, Al-Hinai et al. showed that algebraic attacks were effective against the irregularly-clocked LFSR systems in 2006 [15] . To be secure against the algebraic attack, Kanso presented the generalized clock-controlled alternating step generator in 2009 [16] . However, Hassanzadeh and Helleseth described an algebraic attack against this generator [17] . Irregularly-clock-controlled shift registers are highly vulnerable against side channel attacks, such as simple power analysis and timing attacks [18] (Chapter 7). In particular, this attack could be strongly applied to the shrinking generator and cascade generator, which had resistance to an algebraic attack. To overcome these attacks, new clock-controlled generators were proposed in the European ECRYPT eSTREAM project, such as cascade the jump-controlled generator (named Pomaranch) and the mutual clock-controlled generator (named Mickey) [19] . However, the algebraic attack could be applied on these generators [20] .
In this paper, we present a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator. This generator can be resistant to algebraic attack by maintaining both secure properties and the efficiency of traditional clock-controlled generators. Especially, we can protect this generator against side channel attacks by choosing some parameters easily.
Clock-Controlled Generators
LFSRs are known to allow fast implementation on hardware and produce sequences with large periods and good statistical properties. However, the inherent linearity of these sequences results in susceptibility to algebraic attacks. That is the fundamental reason why LFSRs are not used directly for keystream generation. A well-known method for increasing the linear complexity with preserving the same properties as those sequences is a nonlinear transformation, such as a filter generator and a combination generator. An alternative method to achieve the same goal is to control LFSR clocks, that is a clock-controlled generator.
The components of the clock-controlled generator can be grouped into two subsystems based on functions: a clock generation and a data generation. In general, each component consists of maximum-length LFSRs (m-LFSRs) that produce an output sequence with a maximum possible period. The generator works in the following way:
1. A clock-controlling LFSR is clocked regularly. 2. Output bits of the controlling LFSR are used to determine the clocking. 3. By determining the clocking, a data-generating LFSR is clocked.
In order to describe this process in detail, we label registers A and B with length m and n. The i-th bit of register A at time t is denoted by A t i . Suppose that the i-th bit of A controls the clocking of B in such a way that if it is "0", B is not clocked, and if it is "1", B is clocked j times. In this case, we can express the change to the k-th position of B as Equation (1):
Let f A and f B be a characteristic polynomial and M A and M B be a companion matrix for each register, A and B; the above equation can be represented as Equation (2):
In this section, we describe existing clock-controlled generators and summarize an algebraic attack approach to these generators.
Description of Clock-Controlled Generators
Clock-controlled generators are described in this subsection. These generators produce sequences of large periods, large linear complexity and good statistical properties.
We can represent the process as Equation (6) .
In 2009, Kanso presented the generalized alternating step generator [16] . This generator is similar to the original alternating step generator, except that it is clocked in a variable number of steps. He used the values of W B and W C and the sets {i 0 , i 1 , · · · , i W B −1 } and {i 0 , i 1 , · · · , i W C −1 } to compute a various clocking number. In this generator, these values and sets are considered as a part of the key to be secure against the algebraic attack. The output bits are generated as follows:
1. Register A is clocked. 2. If the output of A is "0", then register B is clocked r(t) times, where r(t) = 1 + 2 0 · A
If the output of A is "1", then register C is clocked s(t) times, where s(t) = 1 + 2 0 · A
4. The output bit is the XOR of the most significant bit of registers B and C.
Cascade Generator
The cascade generator consists of N LFSRs and works in the same way as the stop and go generator [25] . To explain the process of the cascade generator, we describe the cascade generator of three stages. This generator has three LFSRs A, B and C of length m, n and l, respectively, and works in the following way:
1. Register A is clocked. 2. If the output of A is "0", then register B is not clocked; else B is clocked. 3. If the output of the XOR of the most significant bit of registers A and B is "0", then register C is not clocked; else C is clocked. 4. The output sequence is the XOR of the most significant bit of A, B and C.
The above process is represented as Equation (7) and can be expanded into the cascade generator of N stages easily.
(Self-)Shrinking Generator
The shrinking generator [26] , proposed by Coppersmith et al. in 1993, employs two LFSRs A and B of length m and n, respectively. The output sequences are generated as follows:
1. Registers A and B are clocked. 2. If the output of A is "0", then the output of B is discarded. 3. If the output of A is "1", then the output of B forms part of the output sequence.
By modifying this generator, Meier and Staffelbach proposed the self-shrinking generator in 1994 [27] . This generator consist of a single LFSR A and works in the following way:
1. Register A is clocked two times. 2. If the first output of A is "0", then the second output is discarded. 3. If the first output of A is "1", then the second output forms part of the output sequence.
In 2010, Kanso presented the modified self-shrinking generator [28] . The output sequences are generated as follows:
1. Generate the bit-triple (A The output bit of these generators cannot be represented as a determinate equation.
Algebraic Attacks on Clock-Controlled Generators
In paper [15, 20] , the authors described an algebraic attack against clock-controlled generators with the following properties:
• For each register, the transitions from one state to the next must be described by a matrix product of some copies of the given companion matrix.
• For each bit "0" and "1" of the controlling LFSR, the number of copies is fixed. For example, if the control bit is "0", then the number of copy is zero, otherwise the number of copies is one in the stop and go generator.
Using these properties, they produced a family of equations relating the output bits to the internal state bits for generators. The degree of this family of equations could be bounded by two. Therefore, they could obtain the initial state of the generators within a significantly faster time than any other known attack. Since the stop and go generator, self-decimated generator and alternating step generator had the above properties, the algebraic attacks were applied to these generators easily.
As an example, they produced equations for two consecutive output bits of the stop and go generator as follows:
Adding Equations (8) and (9), they could obtain Equation (10) of degree two.
Therefore, the time complexity of this generator for the algebraic attack was O(n 2·ω ).
By the same method, equations bounded by degree two of the self-decimated generator and alternating step generator could be produced easily. In 2010, the generalized alternating step generator, designed for having resistance against the algebraic attack, was analyzed by Hassanzadeh and Helleseth [17] . They used the algebraic attack technique. However, these attacks could not be applied to the (self-)shrinking generator and cascade generator, which did not have the above properties.
Switching Generator
In this section, we present a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator with resistance to an algebraic attack and side channel attack.
Switching Generator Specification
The switching generator, shown in Figure 1 , has two LFSRs A and B of length m and n, respectively. In Figure 1 , a MUX (multiplexer) is a logic that selects one of several inputs [29] . The data-generating LFSR B works as Equation (11) using two companion matrices M 1 and M 2 . These matrices are companion matrices of two primitive polynomials.
The data-generating LFSR B is updated by bits of the controlling LFSR A and two companion matrices M 1 and M 2 . We describe the generating method for output sequences as follows:
1. Register A is clocked. 2. If the output of A is "0", then the register B is clocked by using (M 1 ) i , then the output bit is the most significant bit of this register. 3. If the output of A is "1", then the register B is clocked by using (M 2 ) j , then the output bit is the most significant bit of this register.
The period of the output sequences generated by this generator can be up to a maximum (2 m − 1) · (2 n − 1) if the matrix M 2 is applied repetitively in the clocking process.
We define the ordered pair (i, j) of repetition as the switching index. Through using two distinct companion matrices and a carefully chosen switching index in this generator, we can guarantee that this generator can generate the maximum length sequence. For having resistance to the algebraic attack, this switching index is considered as a part of the key. If we choose this index carefully, this generator can be also resistant to the side channel attack. 
Switching Index
The switching index (SI) (i, j) is determined by bits of the controlling register A, where
We define the smallest multiplication order of a given matrices In these steps, we call the switching matrix (SM) the multiplications of two companion matrices in Step 2 (a) and the detailed process is shown in Example 1. Example 1. Let f c be a characteristic polynomial of degree two for the clock-controlling LFSR and f g 1 , f g 2 be two distinct polynomials of the same degree three for the data generating LFSR.
For each polynomial, companion matrices are as follows: 
In the case of (i, j) = (1, 6), SM is represented as the below matrix. The characteristic polynomial of this matrix is x 3 + x 2 + 1 and is primitive. Therefore, (1, 6 ) is the switching index. We can also find other indexes, such as (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 5), (5, 4) and (6, 1).
SM ( To obtain the switching index for given sizes m and n, we have to compute many operations as follows:
1. Generate the output sequences of clock-controlling A as long as the period of this LFSR.
-The time complexity is 2 m − 1.
For each index (i, j),
-the time complexity is (2 n − 1) × (2 n − 1).
(a) Multiply two companion matrices depending on the output sequences of A.
-The time complexity is (2 m − 1) × O(n 3 ), where O(n 3 ) is the complexity of the multiplication between two n × n matrices and O(•) is the asymptotic upper bound.
(b,c) Compute the characteristic polynomial of the computed matrix and check that this characteristic polynomial is a primitive.
-The time complexity is O(n 3 ), where O(n 3 ) is the complexity for factoring polynomials over the given fields [6] . If the size m and n is large, then the time complexity is very high. Therefore, we expressed this situation as a hard problem.
The total time complexity is (2
m − 1) + (2 n − 1)(2 n − 1){(2 m − 1)O(n 3 ) + O(
Application of Switching Generator
To provide strong robustness, stream ciphers generally use many LFSRs or generators based on LFSR. There are two methods for designing stream ciphers: a combination generator and a filter generator [6] . A5 (GSM) [30] and E0 (Bluetooth) [31] were constructed with a combination generator, and Sober (Nessie project) [32] and Grain eStream project) [33] were designed with a filter generator. It is not good for security that our generator uses many LFSRs with the controlling LFSR because of the guess-and-determine attacks. We can suggest that a stream cipher use many of our generators to meet a design goal, such as 128-bit security and resistance against side channel attacks and algebraic attacks.
The Switching Generator's Properties
In this section, we present the switching generator's properties. The generator has resistance to algebraic attacks with maintaining a large period, linear complexity and good randomness.
Existence of the Switching Index
For given initial states of length m and n, the existence proof of the switching index is a hard problem. Therefore, we consider the probabilistic existence of the switching index, where this probability is the chance that the characteristic polynomial of the switching matrix computed by clock control bits and index (i, j) is primitive. To compute this probability, we use the following facts:
• Since the primitive polynomial must have a non-zero constant term, the number of candidates for the primitive polynomial is 2 n−1
• Over GF(2 n ), there are exactly φ(2 n − 1)/n primitive polynomials of degree n, where φ is Euler's totient function [34] .
Let Pr f,n , shown in Equation (12), be the probability that a polynomial f of degree n in GF(2 n ) is primitive. These values for given degrees n are listed in Table 1 . From Equation (12) and the bounds of index (i, j), we can compute the expectation Exp f,i,n of the existence of the switching index for degree n and a fixed i as Equation (13) . These expectation values for given degrees n are listed in Table 2 .
By Equation (13), we can compute the expectation for degree n = 3 (see Example 1). The expectation is 3.5. Therefore, there are at least three candidates from a theoretical standpoint. However, there are six candidates, such as (1, 6), (6, 1) , (2, 3) , (3, 2) , (4, 5) and (5, 4), in Example 1. 
Properties of the Switching Index
Since the matrix multiplication is not commutative, switching matrices would be changed depending on the output bits of the clock-controlling LFSR. This property means that the period of the output sequence generated by the switching generator would be changed depending on the initial state for the clock controlling LFSR. However, the below Theorem 1 indicates that the period of the switching generator is constant, independent of the initial state for the clock controlling LFSR [35] . Theorem 1. For two square matrices M 1 , M 2 , the characteristic polynomial CP has a property as follows:
on both sides, then obtain the below equation:
Since M 2 · v is non-zero, it is an eigenvector of M 2 · M 1 with the same eigenvalue that M 1 · M 2 had. In this case, λ would also be a root of M 2 · M 1 's characteristic polynomial. Conversely, if λ is a root of CP M 2 ·M 1 (x), then it also is a root of M 1 · M 2 's characteristic polynomial by the same method. Therefore, two characteristic polynomials are the same.
This theorem means that the characteristic polynomials of a circular multiplication for given matrices are the same. Hence, if the clock-controlling LFSR and switching index is fixed, then the switching generator has the maximum period independent of the initial vector for the clock-controlling LFSR.
Choice of the Switching Index
There are many candidates for the switching index. If we can choose this index considering the same number of XOR operations on two matrices (M i ) i and (M 2 ) j , the switching generator has resistance to the side channel attack. By using Example 1, we describe this process of choosing a good switching index. We already found indexes, such as (1, 6), (6, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 5) and (5, 4). For each index, we compare the number of XOR operations. The comparison results are listed in Table 3 . Table 3 . The comparison results of the number of XOR operation. 
Using the comparison results in this table, we can choose the good switching index as (1, 6) or (6, 1) from six candidates.
Period and Linear Complexity [36]
By the definition of switching index, the period of the switching generator is (2 m − 1) · (2 n − 1). The generator's linear complexity LC is shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For the given switching generator consisting of two LFSRs of length m and n, if m divides n, then this generator has the linear complexity as follows:
Proof. In paper [37] , Chambers et al. have considered a type of BRM (binary rate multiplier) whose control and generating registers, A and B, are primitive LFSRs of periods 2 m − 1 and 2 n − 1. They have shown that its output sequence has linear complexity n · (2 m − 1) under two conditions as follows:
1. every prime factor of 2 m − 1 divides 2 n − 1. 2. GCD(α BRM , 2 n −1) = 1, where α BRM is the number of clocks applied to Register B after clocking
This result is able to be applied into a switching generator directly. If m divides n, then every prime factor of 2 m − 1 divides 2 n − 1 [38] . Since the characteristic polynomial of the switching matrix (SM)
is a primitive polynomial for a given switching index (i, j), the integers α S.G and 2 n − 1 are relatively prime, where α S.G is the number of clocks applied to Register B after clocking A 2 m − 1 times for the switching generator. Therefore, the linear complexity of this generator is n · (2 m − 1).
Additionally, the minimal polynomial of the output sequence of the switching generator is exactly f SM (x (2 m −1) ). In Example 1, since f SM (1,6) = x 3 + x 2 + 1, the minimal polynomial of the output sequence is f SM (1, 6) 
Algebraic Properties
At clock t, the internal state B t of the data-generating LFSR is updated according to the bit information of the clock-controlling LFSR and two companion matrices M 1 and M 2 . This process is represented as Example 2 in detail.
Example 2. We use characteristic polynomials for clock-controlling and data-generating LFSRs, defined in Example 1. Then, the switching index is " (1, 6) ", and the switching matrix SM is as follows:
Let the initial state of the data generating LFSR be (0, 0, 1) . the internal states B t are as follows:
(0, 0, 1)
We can represent the update process for these internal states as the matrix product of some copies of the matrix M 1 or M 2 . The number of copies is defined as exponents. The exponents for each matrix M 1 or M 2 are listed in Table 4 . In this table, we can notice that the exponents are not constant for each bit "0" or "1" of the clock controlling LFSR. This is due to the following mathematical property: for two companion matrix M 1 and M 2 of two distinct primitive polynomials, the matrix M 1 cannot be represented as the matrix product of some copy of the matrix M 2 . This explains that the switching generator cannot be implemented as the stop and go generator. Thus, the algebraic attack applied to the stop and go generator cannot be applied to the switching generator.
In Section 3.2, we presented that there are many candidates for the switching index. Additionally, we described that this switching index is considered as a part of the key. This condition is used to guarantee that the switching generator has resistance against the algebraic attack. Even though attackers assume the clock-controlling LFSR, they cannot find the exact switching index among many candidates. Therefore, they cannot construct algebraic equations for the target generator easily. Attackers have to be able to construct algebraic equations for the target algorithm to attack this algorithm with the basic algebraic attack. If they can attack, then they can apply other advanced algebraic attacks, such as fast algebraic attacks [13] and higher order algebraic attacks [39] . However, they cannot construct any algebraic equations in our generator.
Other Security Evaluation
In clock-controlled generators, the basic idea of guess-and-determine attacks is to guess m bits of the clock-controlling LFSR state and derive other n bits through the relationship between the keystream bits and the internal state bits. The time complexity is (2 m − 1) × O(n 3 ), where O(n 3 ) is the complexity of the Gaussian elimination method for n × n matrix [40] . When the keystream bits in the given generator have a significant correlation with the output bits of some LFSRs, we can apply the correlation attacks. Our generator is derived from the alternating step generator. The best time complexity of a correlation attack against the alternating step generator is O(n 2 × 2 n ) [41] . The switching generator is more robust than the alternating step generator, because attackers cannot know the exact switching index, even though they can know all primitive polynomial for all LFSRs. Therefore, we can argue the complexity for being dominated by the time complexity of the alternating step generator. If we can choose the two parameters m and n, such that (2 m − 1) × n ≤ n 2 × 2 n , namely n ≤ m ≤ n × (log 2 n), then the complexity against these attacks is more than the linear complexity. Therefore, the time complexity against all basic attacks is dominated by the time complexity of the linear complexity.
Conclusions
The appearance of fast and efficient block ciphers has caused a diminishing of the importance of stream ciphers due to the convenience of the use of block ciphers in various applications. Therefore, researchers of stream ciphers reviewed some area where stream ciphers would survive: very high speeds in communication links or compact in constrained devices. In the area of constrained devices, LFSRs are used to construct stream ciphers. It has, however, been well known that LFSR-based systems, well suited to low-end hardware implementations, are very vulnerable to algebraic attacks. Furthermore, irregular clock-controlled generators were highly vulnerable against side channel attacks.
In this paper, we proposed a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator. This generator preserved both the security and efficiency of existing clock-controlled generators. In addition, this system could be resistant to algebraic attacks, because determinate equations for this generator, relating the output bits to the internal state bits for this generator, could not be produced. Especially, we could guarantee the resistance against side channel attacks by choosing a good switching index.
